Militarization of Development Aid in Africa: Implications of supplying humanitarian aid to Africa using military
1.0 Introduction
For the past three decades, development aid, also known as humanitarian aid, has drawn global attention to areas affected by conflict, especially those on the verge of becoming failed states. Across Africa, conflicts, both the kind defined by within and out states boarders have necessitated the need for humanitarian actors such as United Nations (UN) and NGOs (non-governmental organizations) to negotiate with all sides in order to deliver aid. However, militaries are becoming more and more involved in implementing development programs, in addition to combating terrorism and participating in conflicts defined by borders. Military intervention has evolved to take on new responsiblities, including those that were once considered unique to humanitarian agencies. Humanitarian agencies have also engaged in collaboration with militaries in crisis management (Yonekawa, 2017). This intersection of responsibilities - using the military to provide to assistance outside of its traditional realm – has led to the militarization of development aid.
Recently, there have been a number of military practices such as contributions to humanitarian aid and reconstruction, including stability and counterinsurgency operations in Africa. International intervention is increasing across Africa, both in the fight against terrorism (Moseley, 2009) and in the deployment of development aid. Some of the world's most powerful countries, such as China, France, Germany, Russia, and the United States, as well as the European Union, are on the front lines of this new way of resolving conflict on the African continent.
Several concerns have been raised as societal challenges are increasingly addressed through a militarized approach. The seeping of counterterrorism and military initiatives into development work threatens to lower the humanitarian efforts. This paper explores the militarization of development aid in Africa and the reasons behind the increased involvement of military actors in the humanitarian sphere. Also discussed are the implications of the militarization of development aid in Africa.
2.0 Background
2.1 Challenges in Africa
Using military forces as development agencies has made huge in-roads in African states. These measures can be attributed to the failure of the African governments to address the constant political, economic, and social problems their citizens face. Across Africa, conflicts are not only drawing resources away from its nations' highly pressing issues, but are also becoming the last frontier of proxy wars between the Eastern and Western powers. Sub-Sahara Africa is home to 1,050,135,841 people (World Population Review, 2020), and countries within this region are finding it hard to fulfill their citizens' most basic needs and provide necessary infrastructure. Despite the continent being rich in resources, most economies are dependent on agricultural exports, which leads to several vulnerabilities. Inconsistent rainfall, price fluctuations and unpredictable demands from Western countries for agricultural exports has made it difficult to develop and grow national budgets consistently. Moreover, a lack of robust infrastructure across the continent, including within the energy, transport, and telecommunication sectors, impedes economic growth. Unfavorable global trade rules, like high tariffs and quotas, poor political governance systems, and ineffective public institutions have immensely contributed to increases in both outside military presences as well as the militarization of development aid in Africa (Yonekawa, 2017).
3.0 Military-nature of responses to African challenges
Today, of the 36 countries in Africa, more than 20 make the World Bank's Harmonized List of Fragile Situations that need humanitarian aid. These are African states where development challenges are due to widespread instability and violence. To tackle and effectively address instability and conflicts in these countries, several initiatives and intervention measures have been put in place.
3.1 United Nations (UN) peace-keeping missions
Currently, 7 out of 14 active UN peacekeeping missions are in Africa, with operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Western Sahara, Mali, Darfur, South Sudan, Sudan (Abeyi) and the Central African Republic. As of April 2018, there were more than 70,000 UN-linked personnel in the region, including both thousands of civilians and international military troops. UN peacekeeping operations are accompanied by other UN specialized agencies including the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the World Food Program (WFP), and the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), among others. Within these operations, troops have been actively involved in delivering humanitarian needs and development aid as part of their mission (United Nations Peacekeeping n.d). In 1992, the UN Department of Peacekeeping (UN DPKO) was formally created; a formal capstone document in 2008 allowed the UN to broaden the security agenda of DPKO and integrate humanitarian efforts into its multidirectional nature. Under this mandate, the UN has continuously deployed peacekeeping forces to offer development aid. In FY2016-2017, the UN approved $7.86 billion towards 15 peacekeeping missions and in FY2019-2020, UN budget allocations towards 13 peacekeeping missions was $6.69 billion (Congressional Research Service 2020).
3.2 United States (US) peace-keeping mission in Africa
The concept of militarization of development aid is not new to the US. In order to win the minds and hearts of local populations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US military was used to strengthen infrastructures in both countries. As an example, troops built bridges and schools. The US has utilized a militarized approach to development while also engaging in conflict resolution in Africa, and supported these efforts with increased foreign aid. In FY2017, U.S. foreign aid totaled $49.87 billion, of which 35% of this assistance was for military aid and nonmilitary security assistance and 18% for humanitarian activities., Currently, the US has more than 36 active military installments and operations, including more than 8 "127-Echo" programs in Africa. 127-Echo programs shift a greater burden of conflict engagement onto local actors.
In West Africa, the US government has been assisting the Malian military in its mission to manage and contain al Qaeda groups in the country. At the same time, the military has also been extensively involved in development work throughout Mali, as well as in several other countries in the Sahel region of West Africa. Presently, military personnel are engaged in development tasks such as repairing schools, health centers, bridges, roads, and wells. US military doctors provide basic vaccinations and treatment. In 2008, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) based in Mali received $9.5 million from the U.S. Defense Department to partner on a counterterrorism program with the US army.
However, it is worth noting that US has continued to increase their military cooperation while reducing their humanitarian efforts (Kellum, 2018). For example, in 2018, the US budget allocated $5.2 billion to humanitarian and development assistance against $8 billion in the fiscal year 2017 (Turse, 2018). Previously, in 2007, former US president George W. Bush established an African Command (AFRICOM) to assume authority over the US forces operations and activities in Africa with the mandate to conduct military operations, if so directed by national command authorities.
The US is using AFRICOM strategically to replace USAID with its military in delivering humanitarian aid. Behind this move are several goals: increasing US influence in Africa, containing China's growing influence in the region, and taking advantage of economic opportunities presented by Africa's many resources such as oil (Falconer, 2008). US budget towards AFRICOM has been increasing annually: in 2007 it received $50 million, in 2008 the amount was $75.5 million, in 2009, $310 million, and $763 million in 2010. Conversely, USAID's budget for the same region has been decreasing: in 2009, USAID received $8.2 billion, $8.09 billion in 2010, $6.9 billion in 2011 (Dagne, 2011).
3.3 China peace-keeping forces in Africa
China is also very actively involved in peacekeeping and security operations in Africa. China, through the UN, has been able to establish itself in Africa as the largest contributor of military troops to UN peacekeeping missions (Smith, 2018). In 2015, China declared their support of UN DPKO and even offered to contribute $1 billion in full by 2030 to a peace and development fund. China also pledged $100 million in military assistance to the African Union (AN) (Peck, 2019).
Currently, China is setting up 127-Echo" programs in Africa security camps in the Central African Republic and South Sudan since the outbreak of war in 2017 to provide stability as civil war rages in both countries. This approach is aimed at protecting its overseas workers and its investment throughout Africa. Besides providing counter-terrorism assistance, China forces are actively engaged in providing humanitarian assistance in South Sudan (Smith, 2018). In Djibouti, in an effort to facilitate peacekeeping and anti-piracy missions in the region, China has established a military base near the Gulf of Aden in 2009 and a People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) logistics support base in South-West of the Doraleh Multipurpose Port.
China has maintained a continuous military presence in the Horn of Africa by deploying more than 26,000 military personnel in the region to carry out various maritime security, peacekeeping, and other operations. It is believed that the Djibouti bases are part of a network of Chinese military bases which serve the strategic purpose of promoting the Chinese presence in the region, gaining control of Indian Ocean, and countering the increased presence of US in the region (Melvin, 2019).
3.4 Other international and agency-led initiatives
Many other militaries' missions in Africa have provided humanitarian needs, for genuine or more subjective reasons. These missions have been deployed by the EU, the AN, France, Germany, Japan, India, Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and others. Countries and agencies have been increasing their military support to pursue their own interests in Africa (Yonekawa, 2017). Germany established its military base in Djibouti in 2001 as part of the global war on terrorism, one of the results of the mission is the increased maritime business interests. France, Germany, and Italy each have military presences in Niger ostensibly for counterterrorism, however they are also involved in providing humanitarian aid while protecting their foreign investments and exerting increased influence in the region.
4.0 Proxy wars and interests in mineral and petroleum resources
Under the guise of counter terrorism and conflict resolution, many countries are building presences in Africa to gain access the continents resources. For example, the US war on terrorism in Africa, especially in Niger, is seen as a strategy to control the country's uranium sources. Niger is fourth in uranium production globally. This therefore presents an opportunity for the US to control uranium resource in Niger especially after increased sanctions on North Korea. French forces are also involved in protecting Niger's uranium reserves, the country's largest economic resource. (World Nuclear Association, 2020).
An additional purpose of the US' ever increasing presence in Africa is to counter China's growing influence there, through its Belt and Road initiative. Like the countries discussed above, China has also increased its military personnel in Africa, citing reasons such as anti-piracy and peacekeeping operations. However, the establishment of the Djibouti base is also seen as a strategic move to counter US presence in the region while protecting China's economic interests in Indian Ocean maritime activities (Melvin, 2019).
The US and China are not the only countries conducting proxy wars in Africa. India also has a military presence in the Horn of Africa, especially in Mauritius, Madagascar and Seychelles, to protect their lanes of maritime commerce and to counter China's increasing military presence in the region (Melvin, 2019). In 2011, Japan established a military base in Djibouti also, to counter China's growing influence in Africa (Melvin, 2019). Russia has had a military presence in the region for over a decade -- in Djibouti since 2008 and Sudan in 2018 -- to grow their influence in Africa and counter the US and EU's increased presence there.
Regional tensions, especially the ongoing conflict in Yemen, have led to other countries building military installments which deliver humanitarian assistance in the Horn of Africa. Iran has had a permanent naval presence in the Gulf of Aden and Eritrea since 2015, to expand their regional influence, to protect a Soviet-era oil refinery, and to counter the increased presence of the Israeli military (Melvin, 2019). Saudi Arabia, not normally an ally of Iran, has also had military presences in Eritrea, Djibouti and Red Sea since 2015 with the aim of supporting its operation in Yemen and counter the increased presence of Israel in the region. Israel has reciprocated, setting up a military presence in Eritrea to counter both Iran' and Saudi Arabia's presence in the region. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is expanding its military presence in the Horn of Africa, especially in Eritrea, to pursue economic interests and to contain Iran's influence in Africa and on the Arabian Peninsula (Melvin, 2019).
5.0 Implications of militarization of development aid in Africa
Though utilizing a military as a humanitarian/development agency is reasonable in a war zone, combining two very different missions is extremely problematic in various other contexts. The reframing of development aid within the fight against terrorism can prove counterproductive, especially when applied in a peaceful country. The increased mix of actors delivering humanitarian aid has resulted in the humanitarian space shrinking in the wake of geo-political maneuvering (Nabi, 2012). As actors have political and economic self-interests to fulfill, beyond humanitarian aid; humanitarian principles such as neutrality, independence and impartiality are no longer observed, putting locals at risk, including non-military humanitarian actors in Africa. Using military to support humanitarian aid defeats the core principle of neutrality and impartiality for effective delivery of aid. It is hard to establish a military presence as neutral, as its very existence it is partisan, representing one side in a conflict. For instance, the interventionist French policies aimed at stabilizing France's African partners have often resulted in shaping authoritarian, reactionary, and violent political orders (Powell, 2020). The ongoing French efforts in supporting Sahelian states such as Mali, Chad and Niger against jihadist, and other armed groups, threatens the very tenet of non-partisan nature of humanitarian aid. Frances's long history of interventionism can only be described as "maintaining stable African political orders broadly favorable to French interests." France has dispatching troops to protect several Chadian dictatorships. In 1986, they launched Operation Épervier, under the guise of containing Libyan invasions, but also to protect the regime of Hissene Habre, who was later "convicted of crimes against humanity" in 2006 (Powell, 2020). French military have always taken a partisan approach in their efforts to keep peace in conflict-prone African countries. French interventions can be boiled down to often following "a consistent logic which emphasizes the protection of local and regional political orders, often at the cost of good governance and long-term stability," (Powell, 2020). The US tried to use military in the Afghanistan conflict to offer humanitarian aid but it failed terribly. This failure has caused huge mistrust of US humanitarian aid efforts (Nabi, 2012).
Humanitarian aid by its very mandate is impartial in nature. However, the humanitarian aid carried out by a military is embedded in political, social and economic decisions and has been means to achieve or protect political interests. Even those humanitarian agencies which have worked closely with peacekeeping forces on coordination of aid experienced tarnished images , jeopardizing their abilities to provide assistance (Nabi, 2012). Overlap in operational verticals increasingly create significant frictions between humanitarian workers and the military. Humanitarian workers face growing distrust from local communities experiencing conflicts, and risk constant attacks because of their involvement with military. This limits their ability to meet locals' essential economic and social needs. Clearly, the use of military in development aid not only sounds a threat to the humanitarian space, but also weakens humanitarian imperative, deteriorates humanitarian coordination, undermines humanitarian principles, and blurs the line between political interests and humanitarian aid. In order to enhance humanitarian agencies' image, militaries should be withdraw from offering humanitarian/development aid.
6.0 Conclusion
This paper has shown that the militarization of development aid to the victims of ongoing conflicts in Africa is supported by historical evidence. The use of military intervention to save lives besides fighting war is slowly changing the shape of the humanitarian industry. Today, every military intervention has its own humanitarian relief program. It is clear that humanitarian aid and action is signifying power, resources and bait, often used merely as a shield only by foreign governments and agencies but also by local governments. Proxy wars, as well as economic and political programs have led to increased application of this approach in the name of countering terrorism. Western countries are only interested in pursuing their agendas. While there are some who are genuinely involved in countering terrorism, most have hidden agendas. Africa should be worried by this new approach.
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